Identity, Interest and the Great Power’s Cooperation Taking China-U.S. relationship as the example in the Copenhagen and Paris Climate Conferences

Abstract

Climate change has become one of the most important challenges for human society. The issue of climate warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions from industrial development has become an important issue in global governance. In response to climate change, on the basis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded in 1992, the parties have promoted global joint action in the form of negotiations. In the international climate negotiations, how to allocate the responsibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reach a binding agreement has become the core issue and practical problem. As the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters and economic entities, China and the United States influence the positions of developing and developed countries respectively. Whether they make commitments and take actions to undertake greenhouse gas emission reduction responsibilities becomes the key to influencing the Global Climate Governance agenda. This paper focuses on how China and the United States can move from conflict to cooperation in international climate negotiations. Based on the analysis of eclecticism, this paper explores the behavior choices of major powers in Global Climate Governance from the perspective of interaction between identity and interests, guided by the realistic issue that China and the United States are moving from conflict to cooperation in international climate negotiations. This paper holds that in the two international climate negotiations in Copenhagen and Paris, the reasons that affect the transition from conflict to cooperation between China and the United States lie in the differences of behavior choice between the two countries under the change of their status and interest mechanism in the international climate negotiations. The judgment of identity mechanism influences the position of great powers as responsible persons, and the judgment of interest mechanism influences the choice of great powers on whether climate reduction will cause loss or increase consideration to national interests. Under the influence of identity mechanism, the participation of major powers in international climate negotiations is different under the choices of the responsible and the non-responsible: the responsible choose cooperation, the non-responsible conflict because of the choice of non-cooperation, affected by the benefit mechanism, the loss of interest makes the country unwilling to assume responsibility and move towards conflict, while the gain of interest is promoted. Make countries actively participate in Global Climate Governance and choose cooperation. Case analysis proves that: in the two negotiations, China and the United States in Copenhagen Conference are both non-responsible persons in their identities, and believe that the action of climate reduction will cause loss of national interests, so cooperation fails; in Paris Conference, China and the United States recognized the status of major countries as responsible persons for climate reduction, and in order to develop domestic low-carbon emissions. Economic-led emission reduction has been achieved, thus realizing cooperation among major powers.