Incentive Management of Power Demand-side Project Construction Considering Environmental Loss Allocation Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

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Zhiqiang Zhang, Xin Huang, Jiajia Huan, Xiaohui Zhang, Yuhua Ji

Abstract

Power demand-side construction projects should consider the potential environmental damage and formulate feasible measures to increase the willingness of participants to take the initiative actions. Methods: This paper innovatively takes the concept of environmental loss cost into the discussion of the project environmental governance issues, and applies the potential cost expenditures of both principal parts to the study of game strategy equilibrium problems.Results:And then, the evolutionary game analysis method is used to discuss the balance of supervision and incentives between government departments and power companies under different strategic choices. Considering the environmental damage cost, the research suggests that taking measures to improve the efficiency of government supervision, reducing supervision costs, or increasing the punishment of power enterprises for delaying responsibility will guide the government's strategy to evolve in the direction of strengthening supervision. Conclusion: Increasing the incentives or penalties for power enterprises of taking active responsibility of environmental will also help improve the environmental governance of power demand-side projects. Finally some research perspectives are brought to the attention of readers.

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