

Identity, Interest and the Great Power's Cooperation Taking China-U.S. relationship as the example in the Copenhagen and Paris Climate Conferences

Xu Bin¹, Helena Varkkey^{2*}

¹Department of International and Strategic Studies, The University of Malaya, Malaya

²Department of International and Strategic Studies, The University of Malaya, Malaya

Corresponding author: xubin02021@163.com

ABSTRACT

Climate change has become one of the most important challenges for human society. The issue of climate warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions from industrial development has become an important issue in global governance. In response to climate change, on the basis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded in 1992, the parties have promoted global joint action in the form of negotiations. In the international climate negotiations, how to allocate the responsibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reach a binding agreement has become the core issue and practical problem. As the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters and economic entities, China and the United States influence the positions of developing and developed countries respectively. Whether they make commitments and take actions to undertake greenhouse gas emission reduction responsibilities becomes the key to influencing the Global Climate Governance agenda. This paper focuses on how China and the United States can move from conflict to cooperation in international climate negotiations. Based on the analysis of eclecticism, this paper explores the behavior choices of major powers in Global Climate Governance from the perspective of interaction between identity and interests, guided by the realistic issue that China and the United States are moving from conflict to cooperation in international climate negotiations. This paper holds that in the two international climate negotiations in Copenhagen and Paris, the reasons that affect the transition from conflict to cooperation between China and the United States lie in the differences of behavior choice between the two countries under the change of their status and interest mechanism in the international climate negotiations. The judgment of identity mechanism influences the position of great powers as responsible persons, and the judgment of interest mechanism influences the choice of great powers on whether climate reduction will cause loss or increase consideration to national interests. Under the influence of identity mechanism, the participation of major powers in international climate negotiations is different under the choices of the responsible and the non-responsible: the responsible choose cooperation, the non-responsible conflict because of the choice of non-cooperation, affected by the benefit mechanism, the loss of interest makes the country unwilling to assume responsibility and move towards conflict, while the gain of interest is promoted. Make countries actively participate in Global Climate Governance and choose cooperation. Case analysis proves that: in the two negotiations, China and the United States in Copenhagen Conference are both non-responsible persons in their identities, and believe that the action of climate reduction will cause loss of national interests, so cooperation fails; in Paris Conference, China and the United States recognized the status of major countries as responsible persons for climate reduction, and in order to develop domestic low-carbon emissions. Economic-led emission reduction has been achieved, thus realizing cooperation among major powers.

INTRODUCTION

As a companion of globalization, global governance is becoming a new challenge in international affairs governance. For sovereign states, how to effectively govern global issues and related international affairs is becoming a major challenge after the end of the cold war. Compared with the order challenges of international system brought by global political or economic system to sovereign countries, global environmental problems are more manifested in the puzzlement of how sovereign countries maintain and develop public goods services and public benefits of the international community. In the bipolar era, the existing hegemonic system and international mechanism are the full options for a few public goods. They successively show the tragedy theory of the commons, the prisoner's dilemma model, the collective action dilemma and other difficult problems. In dealing with marine pollution, ozone layer and acid rain, the great Western countries, under the leadership of the United States, provided public goods through hegemonic mechanisms (Foot and Walter, 2011:3). But the issue of climate change has not been solved together. Because of the cross-regional nature of the climate change issue in the participants and the cross-cutting nature of the issue in the political, economic and development issues, it has become a global governance problem that seriously affects human survival and security development in the era of globalization. However, because greenhouse gas emissions are not only related to atmospheric pollution damage, but also affected by the allocation of emission resources, climate change control has become a difficult problem in the global public goods supply (Aldy & Stavins, 2010:1). The Kyoto Protocol reached in 1997 clarified the definition of greenhouse gases for the first time, and pointed out that the main objective of future international climate negotiations is to control greenhouse gases emissions. The negotiations focused on achieving effective and strong national action to combat climate warming (Victor, 2011:57). This paper focuses on the following practical issues: in the international climate negotiations, how can China and the United States shift from great power conflict to great power cooperation? In the international climate negotiations under the leadership of the United Nations, negotiating parties play a game according to the basic principle of common but differentiated responsibilities established by the Framework Convention. All Parties are struggling around how to allocate responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions reduction to achieve joint action to address climate change, so who should take more responsibility becomes the focus of each meeting. Under the tortuous process of international climate negotiations, the concerns of all parties are increasingly concentrated: whether the negotiations can form a global governance mechanism to deal with climate change; whether major countries actively participate in climate reduction. By 2016, the parties had completed 23 negotiations, three of which had significant impact, namely, the 1997 Kyoto Conference, the 2009 Copenhagen Conference and the 2015 Paris Conference. These three meetings have become milestones in the Conference of the Parties in terms of scale and content. They have reached two legally binding international agreements, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, which have led to a top-down to bottom-up model shift in the allocation of responsibility for climate reduction for all parties. But the results of these three meetings are different from the follow-up development: The United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds of endangering national interests, and the Global Climate Governance under the Kyoto mechanism has been weak. The Copenhagen Conference under the Sino-US conflict ended in frustration, and Global Climate Governance continued to face governance dilemma. At the Paris Conference, China and the United States achieved cooperation among major powers, and the Paris Agreement joined the post-Kyoto Global Climate Governance agenda. One of the prominent differences in the consequences of these three conferences is that China and the United States, as major powers, have acted as choices in Global Climate Governance and international climate negotiations. Whether the two sides are willing to participate in Global Climate Governance and assume responsibility for Climate Governance has affected the success of international climate negotiations and the progress of global climate governance. That is to say, whether large countries cooperate in global climate governance has become an important practical issue affecting global governance.

Therefore, the study on the differences of Sino-US behavioral choices in international climate negotiations is not only a concern for the realistic issue of global climate governance, but also a theoretical response to the behavioral dilemma faced by large countries that need to safeguard national interests and shoulder the responsibility of global public interests. This paper takes climate conferences in Copenhagen and Paris as examples to analyze the reasons for the differences in behavior choices between China and the United States, which are the largest greenhouse gas emitters in the world at present: how to change from great power conflict to great power cooperation? This paper holds that, on the basic principle that all countries should bear common but differentiated responsibilities as required by the Framework Convention, the behavior adjustment of China and the United States in international climate negotiations is the difference of choice preferences between the two sides under the pressure of responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions arising from global climate governance: they are both subjected to rationalism. Under the path of interest factors, it is also impossible to avoid the interference of identity under the path of constructivism. Therefore, from the perspective of this analytic approach, the behavioral choices of China and the United States in the two conferences are influenced by both identity and interest mechanisms. In the Copenhagen negotiations, China and the United States considered the possible loss of national interests and refused to accept the identity of the main responsible person for climate governance. Therefore, there was a conflict of positions between the two sides, which led to the failure of the meeting to reach a legally effective agreement. At the Paris Conference, China and the United States adjusted their self-identity in participating in international climate negotiations, defined their domestic interests, development needs and emission reduction plans on the basis of identity definition, and pledged to assume corresponding responsibilities in climate governance, and promoted global gas in the form of Sino-US cooperation. Cooperation in waiting governance. But in 2017, Trump announced that the United States would stop the Paris Accord on Climate Change Mitigation in 2015. What changes Trump's action will bring to the era of Global Climate Governance 3.0 is also one of the focuses of this paper.

Literature Review

As a global governance issue, action to address climate change covers all national actors and non-state actors concerned with the issue. The EU and the third world countries are active negotiators, while the big emitters from China and the United States are the national actors that really influence the negotiation agenda. Negotiations are not limited to greenhouse gas emissions, but also include national adaptation and climate finance and technology support. However, this paper responds to the issue of the impact of major countries on international climate negotiations. Therefore, this paper focuses on the performance of China and the United States as the two largest greenhouse gas emitters in international climate negotiations. China and the United States were chosen as the research subjects because they have indispensable influence on the positions of developing countries and developed countries in international climate negotiations, especially on the emerging developing countries and industrialized developed countries; moreover, as the two largest greenhouse emission countries and economic entities, China and the United States are the two largest greenhouse emission countries. Acceptance and commitment to reduce domestic industrial carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions will affect the effectiveness of global action to reduce emissions. Because mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions has always been a standard that can be quantified in negotiations, but also a direct factor affecting global climate change. Therefore, this paper focuses on whether international climate negotiations can reach an international agreement, focusing on whether major powers can take cooperative and positive action on carbon dioxide-based greenhouse gas emission reduction in the negotiations.

In the 23 international climate negotiations that have been held, the focus of the negotiations is how to determine the responsibility of each party and others for climate governance. Negotiations have always been difficult because of fundamental conflicts of interest in countries' responsibility for climate reduction. From the action response of the parties, the existing research mainly focuses on two analytical approaches: 1) the impact of individual choice of national actors on international climate negotiations based on national interests and preferences of rational actors. From the perspective of responsibility and interests, they studied the negotiating positions of different parties and negotiators

between China and the United States, and the national game from the perspective of political economy including carbon emissions trading (Heggelund, 2007:155). However, rational choice is more likely to cause prisoner's dilemma. Under the influence of global governance failure, the path of rational research has not achieved real progress in global climate governance. The other is the normative research paradigm, including the research on climate governance norms and international regimes in international climate negotiations, and how to adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to form a mechanism for allocating responsibility for climate reduction among countries (Winkler&Beaumont, 2010:638). They pay attention to the national rights of the negotiating parties, and pay attention to the normative construction in Global Climate Governance and the negotiation process in international climate negotiations. However, the establishment of norms is not a one-day success. They have failed to reach an effective international climate agreement, especially on how to promote major powers to take active action in climate negotiations. In the study of the two paths, one issue that has always been concerned is: what mechanisms influence the behavior of large countries, and how do their choices affect the process of global climate governance? From the perspective of the process of international climate negotiations, China and the United States are becoming the key to influencing the global climate governance agenda in the international climate negotiations. Their choice, especially how to successfully move from conflict to cooperation in the negotiation process, has obviously become a new research fact and a research question to be answered urgently.

Great Power Conflicts in International Climate Negotiations

In accordance with the requirements of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the first Conference of the Parties, held in Berlin, Germany in 1995, started the negotiation process of global climate reduction action in the form of Berlin authorization, focusing on how to determine the quantified greenhouse gas emission reduction obligations of industrialized countries. In the slow progress of international climate negotiations, the parties to the negotiations have been in confrontation and conflict for a long time, and have changed from camp conflict to the struggle of emission responsibility among the major powers.

At the Climate Conference held in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, the participating countries recognized the major historical emission responsibilities of the developed industrial countries for global and regional climate issues on the basis of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol distinguished the different responsibilities of Annex 1 and non-Annex Parties. The former is mainly industrialized developed countries, which have assumed specific and clear responsibility for greenhouse climate reduction since 2005; the latter is mainly developing countries, which voluntarily choose whether to participate in climate reduction actions. During the negotiation of Kyoto Protocol, this simple division of camps slowed down the progress of global climate governance; the group of countries led by the United States expressed different standpoints from other developed countries in the European Union and refused to accept mandatory quantified emission reduction obligations; and in the developing countries, they were affected by the threat of climate warming. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the very least developed countries (LDCs) not only blame the developed countries for their negligence, but also express more clearly their strong attitude that China and India are responsible for their growing greenhouse gas emissions (Koehn, 2014:14). As a result, there has been a division of camps (Barnett, 2000:8). The divergence of the two camps is inevitable, which leads to the multi-game of international climate negotiations. This situation is further complicated by the behavioral choices of the major powers. The United States withdraws from Kyoto mechanism in 2001 for endangering national interests and is followed by other developed countries (Cherry and Hovi, 2014:18).

Despite the unsatisfactory outcome of the negotiations, the international climate negotiations are continuing and the participation of States parties is increasing. By the Paris Conference in 2015, the number of parties to the Framework Convention had increased from over 140 to 197. Negotiators all agree that international climate cooperation needs the joint action of all countries, especially the cooperation of major powers. In the international climate negotiations involving Chinese and American leaders, the two climate negotiations held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009 and Paris, France, in 2015 have become important conferences. The former has the negotiating task of setting the agenda for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and the latter will decide where global climate governance

will go after the Kyoto mechanism in 2020. Consequently, the two meetings attracted the attention of all countries and non-state actors around the world and gave the international community the hope of reaching a second legally binding international agreement. At the Copenhagen Conference, there were obvious differences among the major powers on how to determine the responsibility of the major powers for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, especially whether the major developing powers should become the main responsibility for climate governance, and the biggest role change since the international climate negotiations took place: the developed countries required the developing countries to undertake the quantified greenhouse first. Gas emission reduction; China replaces the United States as the main country responsible for climate reduction. This deliberate approach to filtering greenhouse gas emissions and blurring the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is the last straw to overwhelm the conference. In response to the Danish draft led by the United States, China and other developing countries put forward the Beijing text, which represents the position of the four basic countries (Mckibben, 2015:191). The confrontation between the Danish draft and the Beijing text is not only a campaign struggle represented by major greenhouse gas emitters, but also a positive conflict between China and the United States in international climate negotiations as major greenhouse gas emitters: both sides are based on the consideration of safeguarding their own interests, especially reducing the loss of national interests under the responsibility of climate reduction. Refuse to assume the identity of the responsible person and mandatory emission reduction responsibility required by others. Eventually, the meeting failed to reach an effective global climate governance agreement, but joint action to address climate change is still not stopped. The experience of 23 international climate negotiations so far has proved that the main body of climate change response is still a national actor. On the increasingly pressing issue of climate change, the international community needs to improve the effectiveness of climate change cooperation mechanisms and the flexibility of national actions on greenhouse gas emission reduction (Chung, 2013:5), Only in this way can more countries participate more actively in global greenhouse gas emission reduction actions. Climate change calls for joint global action, but the sovereignty attribute determines that the state's response to climate change, a global governance issue, is still based on voluntary action. After the Copenhagen negotiations, although the international community hopes to reach a new international climate cooperation agreement, the behavior choice of sovereign countries, especially great powers, is more important. In global governance, the urgency of Climate Governance makes it more important for major countries to participate in climate governance, especially in the form of cooperation between major countries (Brenton, 2013:541). In recent years, frequent climate disasters and climate risks in various countries urgently need collective action of the international community, and more importantly, the determination and action of major powers. The Paris Conference was once again endowed with public expectations by the international community. Promoting cooperation between China and the United States has become the ownership of guiding global climate governance. To reach a more effective global agreement to tackle climate change, sovereign countries need to cooperate with each other on the opportunity of developing a low-carbon economy, so as to promote the formation of a global climate governance mechanism after 2020. Therefore, it has become an inevitable requirement in the study of Global Climate Governance to explore how to achieve cooperation between China and the United States in climate governance.

The Possibility of Cooperation among Great Powers in International Climate Negotiations

The difficult progress of international climate negotiations shows that global climate governance is still a difficult problem in current global governance. Climate change is so difficult to solve, not only because it is a global public goods issue, but also because the negotiating parties lack responsibility and action (Cherry, 2016:10). For example, in the discussion of how to achieve effective cooperation in the field of climate between China and the United States, political and security factors cannot be ignored. But the first thing they have to face is the pressure of responsibility for national actors to actively participate in greenhouse gas emission reduction under the impact of climate change, that is, who should take more responsibility. However, promoting international climate negotiations and cooperation among major powers in global climate governance is not only an effective way to relieve the pressure of major powers on climate reduction, but also a positive response to the allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emission reduction among national actors in global climate change. Great powers need to reach a consensus on whether they

accept the responsibility of reducing emissions in Global Climate Governance and how to allocate the responsibility in order to further confirm their specific responsibility in Climate Governance and make positive and credible commitments and actions. Whether the United States or China is involved in the action of climate reduction, the main goal is still to safeguard national interests. The differences between the two countries judgments of national interests form a space for cooperation. Just as the United States attaches great importance to national interests, China's main purpose in international climate negotiations is to ensure national economic interests (Aunan, 2007:471). The three factors that affect whether the United States joins in climate reduction are scientific scepticism. Climate change as a security threat and as an economic opportunity. The third factor will obviously help the United States to participate more actively in climate negotiations (Gupta, 2014:154). The 2003 Secret Report on Climate Change and Its Significance to U.S. National Security first identified climate change as a precursor to the impact of U.S. national interests, especially security interests. In June 1997, Byrd-Hagel Resolution made the United States put forward for the first time that climate reduction might cause harm to the United States, including economic benefits, which made the Kyoto Protocol signed by the Clinton Administration ineffective. The Bush administration emphasized the harmfulness of climate change to the interests of the United States and refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol. After Obama took office, from the perspective of national security, he took more active actions and attitudes than the previous government, and actively pursued the new green economy policy. The main contents of this policy are: combining energy innovation with economic development and environmental protection, focusing on the potential of carbon emission reduction trading market, and with the strategic intention of monopolizing the global technology system in the new century with the opportunity of clean energy technology, maintaining the hegemonic position of the world economy (Neumann and Srezepek, 2014:411). Greenhouse gas emission reduction is not only affecting the judgment of the national interests of the United States, but also has become the core concern of the Obama administration in trying to grasp the political leadership of international climate. Mr. Obama also recognizes that American initiatives require shared partners, and expects other global forces to take on more responsibility (Pugh, 2015:41). As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the largest developing country, China is an important partner choice. Since China's participation in the United Nations Environment Conference in 1972, and until 2012 in the international climate negotiations, the fundamental factor in China's climate foreign policy has been national interests. The internal needs of China's development have always been the main driving force for climate foreign policy-making and development. In this process, China has also achieved the transformation from a political revolutionary power outside the international community to an economic developing country that maintains the stability of the international community. China's attitude at the Copenhagen Conference shows that the reason that affects China's participation in the mechanism of climate reduction lies in China's domestic economic development interests (Conrad, 2012:145). China's action to reduce climate emissions needs to match the speed of economic development. The report of the 18th National Congress clearly points out that the energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions per unit of domestic market will be reduced significantly, and the total emissions of major pollutants will be reduced significantly (politics. people, 2012). The Chinese government has realized the close relationship between environmental problems, including air pollution, and carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the resulting environmental vulnerability and national responsibility. From the perspective of domestic demand, Premier Li Keqiang proposed that the whole society actively implement carbon emission reduction in 2014 to declare war on pollution (Koehn, 2016:36). In terms of national responsibility, President Xi Jinping has demonstrated China's responsibility for environmental protection on different occasions and speeches at home and abroad: he said that China will develop a low-carbon economy, create a good production and living environment for the people, and contribute to global ecological security (politics. people, 2012). At the same time, China will continue to shoulder its international obligations, carry out in-depth exchanges and cooperation in the field of ecological civilization with other countries in the world, promote the sharing of achievements, and jointly build a beautiful ecological home of the earth (cpc.people, 2014). Influenced by the interests driving force of domestic climate reduction, China and the United States have adjusted their self-identity in participating in international climate negotiations, and China and the United States have

reached a series of bilateral climate cooperation agreements through bilateral negotiations. In 2014, China and the United States announced their own standards on carbon emission reduction (joint announcement of carbon reduction, 2014:530). By 2030, the carbon emission reduction share of the cooperation between the two sides will reach one third of the global carbon emission reduction share. On the basis of reiterating the Joint Statement on Climate Change issued by the heads of State of China and the United States in 2013 and 2014, a joint statement on climate change between China and the United States dollar was reached in August 2015 (xinhuanet, 2015). The signing of the Sino-US Climate Cooperation Statement is regarded as an obvious positive progress in China's participation in Global Climate Governance and climate negotiations, and has played a great role in the convening of the Paris Conference (Carafa, 2015:8). In the statement, both China and the United States expressed their commitment to ensuring common and differentiated responsibilities in order to promote and maintain the outcome of the Paris Conference. The United States started from the Clean Energy Development Mechanism and strengthened cooperation with other countries in clean energy while proposing the Clean Energy Act of the United States. On the basis of global warming, China has achieved greenhouse gas emissions through technological progress, and strived to reach peak emissions by 2025 (Jiang & Zhuang, 2013:55).

Research Method

In order to solve the research problems, this paper applies two research methods: comparative case study and eclecticism. This is also the innovation of this paper. The former compares two cases of negotiation between Copenhagen and Paris. Case selection can show comparative effect to achieve the purpose of analysis. The latter lies in the application of eclecticism, which makes this study no longer confined to the existing research model of constructivism and rationalism, but attempts to establish a meso-analysis framework to explore the relationship and behavior choice of major powers in global climate governance, and then to provide reference for the analysis of national behavior in global governance. Firstly, the comparative case study method is adopted, and the Copenhagen and Paris conferences are chosen as the comparative case analysis: the former is the failure of cooperation, the latter is the success of cooperation. There are two opposite results of cooperation and non-cooperation on the same topic, which provide specific and clear objects of observation and comparison for academic research and practical research. The performance of China and the United States in the two meetings was quite different: in Copenhagen, China and the United States both hoped to achieve a free-rider strategy in dealing with the responsibility of climate reduction. The tit-for-tat between the Danish draft and the Beijing draft led to the failure of the meeting to reach a legally effective agreement. At the Paris Conference, the Sino-US Joint Statement on Climate Change laid the foundation for the success of the Paris Conference and contributed to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in the twenty-first international climate negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Through the comparative study of two different cases, it is easier to find out the reasons for cooperation between great powers.

Analytical eclecticism is problem-oriented, and its focus is to find multiple correlations between the mechanisms and logic that were originally analyzed separately in different research traditions. Analytical eclecticism transcends the boundaries of paradigms. Taking into account various factors from different paradigms, the theory of international relations may be more explanatory. Therefore, this paper applies two key variables of identity and interest in Constructivism and rationalism. From the perspective of Constructivist theory, the change of Sino-US position in international climate negotiations is influenced by the status determination. The position opposition in Copenhagen Conference results from the refusal of the two sides to assume the main responsibility of Climate Governance required by the international community; while in Paris Conference, both China and the United States have adjusted their status. The positioning, to make a clear response to whether to recognize the responsibility of this identity, has enhanced the willingness of countries to participate in Climate Governance and take action to reduce climate emissions. From the perspective of rationalism, the behavior choice of China and the United States in international climate negotiations lies in the judgment of national interests. From Copenhagen to the Paris Conference, China and the United States have changed their judgment on the impact of climate mitigation actions on national interests.

Sino-US Behavior Choice in International Climate Negotiations: Identity and Interest Determination

In the international climate negotiations, the difference lies in how to deal with the allocation of responsibilities in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. From the reality and forecast of greenhouse gas emissions, China, as a representative of emerging powers, has jointly become the main negotiating party in international climate negotiations with the United States. Joint action on climate change is more likely to bring short-term costs, while possible benefits may only be in the future (Schiele, 2014:16). Therefore, although both China and the United States recognize that the key action to address climate change is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Holland, 2008:19), but whether and how to take action are still faced with the double difficulties of identifying and judging interests.

Research Path of Rationalism

Interest is the fundamental factor affecting a country's foreign policy. When sovereign countries participate in international climate negotiations, their behavior strategies are all aimed at achieving the main goal of national interests (Genovese, 2014:610). As part of the national interests of the United States, one of the purposes of the United States participating in climate reduction actions is to maintain the international credibility of the United States and ensure its global leadership on climate issues (Aldy and Stavins, 2010:120). In participating in international climate negotiations, the United States defines national interests based on five criteria: environmental effects, avoidance of economic losses, positive economic effects, cost of development actions, and cost control (Saunders, 2006:190). It includes not only the consideration of American domestic interests, but also the measurement of the benefits of American participation in global action. However, from the perspective of gains and losses of interests, different judgments in different periods of government in the United States have led to different attitudes of the United States on whether to assume responsibility, and the opposite actions have taken place. Taking the Bush administration as an example, he expressed different attitudes and acted differently. Bush (2004) argued that no one can say with certainty to what extent the dangerous level of warming is and what level of warming should be avoided. Therefore, the Bush administration believed that participating in global climate governance was of no benefit to the United States, and eventually announced the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds of endangering the national interests of the United States (White House, 2001). The successor, Barack Obama, is the opposite. The Obama administration is particularly concerned about climate change. He sees Climate Governance as a key international issue directly related to U.S. national security and economic development opportunities to tackle climate change. Mr. Obama is actively promoting green energy reform at home. He not only believes that climate reduction can be achieved, but also helps to reconstruct the leadership position of the United States in global climate governance. Therefore, Mr. Obama regards the new green policy, which is dominated by clean energy, as an important measure to safeguard the interests of the United States after the financial crisis, and has the strategic intention of monopolizing the global technology system in the new century (Nagashima & Dekkink, 2008:343). Moreover, by participating in and leading the greenhouse gas emission reduction agenda, the United States will be conducive to the development of the carbon emissions trading market, and can maintain its position of world economic hegemony by realizing its dominance in this field (Neumann and Srezepek, 2014:411).

China's consideration on climate reduction is that the action of reducing emissions cannot harm the interests of domestic development, which has always been the main driving force of China's climate foreign policy. Therefore, the Chinese government's position on participating in international climate negotiations is also flexible: in international climate negotiations, China will adjust the position of responsible persons involved in climate governance. China's decision-making choice in climate change governance is based on the influence of the international system and the international community at the earliest stage, while it is influenced by domestic interests at the later stage (Jeon, 2006:846). Influenced by domestic economic interests, China's interest criteria for participating in international climate negotiations have also changed (Downie, 2013:36). China's basic position and principle are: to safeguard its own development rights and space, and never undertake the obligations of reducing greenhouse gas emissions that are not compatible with its own development stage. In response to climate change, China's efforts in climate diplomacy

under the Clean Energy Mechanism are aimed at economic interests (Chen, 2008:145). Therefore, in the international climate negotiations, China is shaping a positive international image with responsible stakeholders, participating in global climate governance, and advancing China's climate governance agenda in the way of national interests (Kopra, 2012:121). In the international climate negotiations, the basic camp of negotiations has been formed: the EU, which actively calls for climate reduction, the industrialized developed countries, which are slow-responding and cautious, and the developing countries, which require the developed countries to take the main responsibility. But when China's greenhouse gas emissions become the first, the original position of excluding them and its failure, the urgency of Climate Governance makes the importance of cooperation among major powers increased (Brenton, 2013:541). Will great powers become leaders in global climate governance? The global reality of climate change shows that global climate governance is demanding for leaders, and it needs to provide selective incentives for all actors to ensure that participants can receive non-neutral remuneration from public goods. And leaders should also provide international public goods for Global Climate Governance for all countries. From the existing research, the status of China and the United States in global climate governance has indeed changed, and their roles are naturally different. From the negotiations on ozone holes and acid rain caused by sulfur dioxide emissions to the global climate governance process to tackle climate change that began in the 1990s, the role of the United States has changed surprisingly: In the early 1970s, the United States, as a global leader, played an unparalleled role in environmental issues, leading the world to an agreement on joint action on ozone layer and acid rain; but during President Nixon's and subsequent presidential terms, U.S. environmental action has been unable to achieve its stated goals. The United States has changed from a leader to a laggard. For a long time, China did not consider itself responsible for climate governance. On the contrary, from the perspective of developing countries, China is one of the victims of global climate change. However, in the process of negotiation, the change of status does affect the judgment of interests. Participating in Global Climate Governance in a more active role has become one of the major countries action options.

Constructivist Perspective: Identity Determination Affects Behavior Choice

In global governance, the actions of state actors are regarded as an important part of the common actions of the international community, and the actions of sovereign states are bound to be constrained by identity. Because in the international climate negotiations, whether a great power has a clear identity will affect its enthusiasm and willingness to participate in climate governance. When the judgment of interests is not clear, the definition of identity is more important. At the same time, individual identity has dual attributes of self-cognition and social cognition, which can produce motivation and behavior characteristics. Two kinds of ideas can enter identity: one is the idea of self-possession, the other is the idea of others (Wendt, 1992 : 391). Therefore, it is necessary to define the identity of national actors in international climate negotiations, and it is also an important factor that will inevitably affect the negotiation process. In Global Climate Governance and international climate negotiations, all Member States of the international community are expecting to choose a leader for climate public goods. For a long time, the EU has been regarded as a leader in climate negotiations, but leaders must provide public interests. The EU does not have the strength and influence of leaders. There has been a domestic call for the United States to assume its primary responsibility and leadership in addressing climate change (Tamm, 2012:80), but the United States has gone from being a leader to a laggard (Cox and Stokes, 2012:353). Therefore, in the international climate negotiations, from the perspective of identifying major actors, whether there are leaders becomes the first question to be answered.

Eclecticism: the interaction of identity and interests affects the behavior choice of great powers

In global climate governance, the requirement for national actors is to achieve truly effective joint action on climate change. While acknowledging the possible loss of national interests caused by climate mitigation actions, major countries are also under pressure from the international community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the requirements of major countries in international climate negotiations. And the impact of climate mitigation action on national interests is still an important factor. Only when national interests have internal driving force, can we achieve the positive emission reduction action of large countries. As two indispensable powers in global climate governance, the behavior choice of China and the United States in international climate negotiations is affected by

the interaction of identity and interests. In other words, the behavioral choices of major powers in Global Climate Governance and international climate negotiations show an analytical eclecticism path. Analytical eclecticism, as a method of comprehensive integration, focuses on the relationship and interaction between many causal mechanisms, which were originally studied in isolation in different paradigms. Analyzing the eclecticism model, this paper studies the dialectical development relationship between individual and collective actors and material and conceptual structures in international politics. The application of analytic eclecticism in this paper considers that, on the one hand, sovereign countries are facing a choice problem in participating in Global Climate Governance and international climate negotiations. How to effectively realize their role in global governance while guaranteeing national interests has become a reality test. On the other hand, in the international climate negotiations, the main factors affecting the choice of national behavior are still interests and identities, which represent the domestic and international considerations of national participation in Global Climate Governance respectively. At the same time, identity and interest mechanism act as causal mechanism of constructivism and rationalism respectively. In order to choose a theoretical guidance role, but in the actual international climate negotiations show an important interaction effect. Under the influence of dual mechanisms of identity and interests, there will be three modes of action for major powers in international climate negotiations, which will ultimately show whether they cooperate or not.

Model 1: Conflicts between non-responsible persons under loss of interest

Under the influence of the pressure of responsibility for climate mitigation, under the dual influence of interest mechanism and identity mechanism, national actors regard participation in climate mitigation as the response of non-responders under the loss of interest, which will lead to conflicts among major powers. For example, the United States withdrew from the Kyoto mechanism on the grounds of loss of interest, which resulted in the failure of Annex I action in the negotiations after the Kyoto Conference and the withdrawal of industrialized countries after the end of the first Kyoto commitment. Both China and the United States refuse to assume the mandatory responsibility for greenhouse gas emission reduction: the United States wants to get rid of the constraints of the Kyoto mechanism and transfer the responsibility to China, while China refuses to assume the main responsibility for climate change Governance on the basis of fulfilling its commitments and jeopardizing the development of China's domestic economic interests (Conrad, 2012: 435). Therefore, the consideration of loss of interest and the positioning of non-responsible persons lead to conflicts rather than cooperation between countries in climate negotiations.

Model 2: Prisoner's Dilemma Caused by Liability for Loss of Interest

In the era of globalization, prisoner's dilemma and collective action dilemma have emerged successively in global climate governance. In response to this issue, the primary consideration of national actors is the possible loss of benefits from participating in climate mitigation actions. In the game of international climate negotiation, the game of all parties, especially the game of big powers, is the game of prisoners dilemma. On the one hand, they believe that climate reduction will cause loss of national interests, and that their own action will make other countries bear less responsibility. Therefore, all parties adhere to the dominant strategy of letting others bear more responsibility for emission reduction under the premise of non-emission reduction. On the other hand, negotiators refuse to recognize the main responsibility in climate reduction, even in the case of climate change, countries are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions generated by industrial development, and refuse to take the responsibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions as the main responsibility on the basis of the difference between historical responsibility and cumulative responsibility. Under the influence of these two aspects, Nash equilibrium results will appear in international climate negotiations, in order to avoid losses to national interests, they will choose not to reduce emissions. For example, in the Copenhagen negotiations, the United States asked China to propose quantitative emission reduction targets as a prerequisite for negotiations, which led to a typical prisoner dilemma in the negotiations.

Model 3: Free-rider Behavior of Non-Responsible Persons under Benefit Acquisition

In order to cope with the global climate governance problems caused by greenhouse gas emissions caused by industrialization, in order to minimize their own costs, each country will choose to hitchhike, and the rational behavior

of global cooperation to reduce emissions will be difficult to achieve. Global climate governance needs to respond to the question of how to protect the public interests of global climate in terms of climate change, especially warming under greenhouse gas emissions. In the era of globalization, greenhouse gas emission reduction, as a global public product issue that every sovereign country has to deal with, has become a free-rider instead of a country willing to provide public services on its own initiative. Since there is no effective incentive and punishment mechanism in global climate governance, neither a ready-made mechanism to punish a country with huge greenhouse gas emissions nor a reward for actively implementing greenhouse gas emission reduction, countries prefer to hitchhike, that is, to let others bear more. Responsibility. This is also an important reason why the Kyoto mechanism is in trouble. Industrialized developed countries believe that it is unfair for them to assume compulsory responsibility for climate reduction, and will provide free-rider opportunities for other countries. In this case, they believe that the action of reducing emissions will be offset by the effect of greenhouse gas emissions from China's emerging powers. Therefore, the Kyoto mechanism has a resistance response, which is manifested in the withdrawal of the United States. Nevertheless, industrialized developed countries such as the United States also have free-rider opportunities. Therefore, developed countries insist that developing countries should be responsible for their greenhouse gas emissions, which is reflected in the deadlock in the Copenhagen negotiations when the United States asked China and other developing countries to undertake quantitative climate reduction responsibilities.

Sino-US Conflict in Copenhagen Negotiations

In international climate negotiations, collective action is needed to address climate change. But the challenge of seeking collective action comes from how different countries judge and choose their commitment to climate reduction. In the global climate game, the contradictions and conflicts in the climate negotiations are considered to originate from the differences and inequalities between the needs and interests of the actors themselves. National commitments and actions are seen as challenges to equality and integrity in a fragmented world (Aldy and Stavins, 2010:17), but more consideration is given to the impact on national interests. The Copenhagen Conference came at a time when the global financial crisis broke out, and the choice of countries affected by it was more difficult: how to achieve a balance between national interests and emission reduction commitments.

First of all, the negotiating position of the United States is judged by national interests. In global environmental governance, a country can enjoy the benefits of environmental improvement brought about by other countries efforts without taking action. If it can enjoy the effect of sharing results without sharing responsibility, it will inevitably be contrary to the phenomenon of American economic externalities. Therefore, the United States cannot tolerate free-riding opportunities for other countries, especially developing countries, in climate governance, and is particularly concerned that the mandatory responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions reduction will reduce the advantages and leading position of the United States in economic development. Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol will shift the U.S. economy from strong growth to recession, and will have a potentially significant impact on the global economy (Whitehouse, 2001). It will damage the U.S. economy, so the U.S. government insists on refusing to accept the responsibility of climate reduction under the Kyoto agreement. Despite Obama's commitment to climate reduction targets, the achievement of legally effective climate reduction actions requires the approval of the United States Congress. Because greenhouse gases are directly related to the economic growth of the United States, American business and industrial groups, representing domestic interest groups, are also actively influencing the environmental foreign policy of the United States (Whitehouse, 2001). Private economic interest groups have long resisted greenhouse gas regulation more strongly, while the U.S. government opposes any binding agreements on greenhouse gas emissions. The lobby groups in the fossil fuel industry have been working to persuade Congress to refuse to accept the mandatory climate reduction responsibilities and obligations set out in the international climate negotiations (Agrarwala and Anderson, 1999:462), and domestic oil and automotive industry groups are opposed to the U.S. government's action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2009, the American Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers Association opposed greenhouse gas cap and trade legislation and the EPA's regulatory authority on greenhouse gases (Foot and Walter, 2011:215). This provision also played a role in Copenhagen, where Congress did

not complete the climate legislation process at the time of the Copenhagen Conference, because of doubts that the development of climate change-related provisions would affect the economic development of the United States and reduce employment opportunities. Domestic legislation has not yet been completed, thus restricting the capacity of the United States to act in Copenhagen. From the perspective of international climate negotiations, the main concern is the impact of US expenditure on climate reduction. US expenditure on climate change mainly includes three items: expenditure on climate change technology, expenditure on climate change science and expenditure on international aid for climate change. The federal government's expenditure on climate change increased by 116% from \$2.4 billion in 1993 to \$5.1 billion in 2004, and 55% of its expenditure in 2004 was spent on climate change adaptation (gao.gov, 2004). The US's low emission reduction targets prompted other countries to adopt more conservative emission reduction targets at Copenhagen Conference, and directly affected the global greenhouse gas emission reduction process. The highly anticipated Obama administration did not set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in line with its international status at the Copenhagen Conference, which seriously affected the formulation of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and the final agreement of the participating countries.

Secondly, China's position in the international climate negotiations is to consider national interests from the perspective of capacity and responsibility. To encourage developing countries to take an active part in climate mitigation actions, it is necessary to match their national interests and capabilities with the responsibility for mitigation (Victor, 2011:646). China's position in the climate negotiations is based on the impact on national interests of undertaking climate emission reduction obligations. On the one hand, China insists on two unchanged positions: China does not undertake any emission reduction obligations at the present stage and opposes linking climate change with other issues; on the other hand, China insists on the unchanged position because it believes that The social and economic costs of mitigation actions are too high to be affordable in China. The cost of China's climate reduction commitments in the climate negotiations has affected China's climate policy. If China can implement low-cost and high-benefit domestic climate reduction policies, it will be conducive to China's positive action in climate reduction (Aunan, 2007:471). Therefore, China insists on its own commitment to reduce climate emissions, and believes that it is unfair to require developing countries to undertake quantitative targets for reducing climate emissions. China has expressed its willingness to assume corresponding responsibilities independently, but not primarily (Olbrisch and Haites, 2011:970). At the same time of economic development, China is more conscious and proactive in the action of climate emission reduction. Since 2008, China has put forward its own greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, and issued annual reports on China's policies and actions to address climate change by the Development and Reform Commission of the Chinese Government. In the 2008 annual report, the Chinese government aims to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by about 20% by 2010 compared with 2005, and to reduce carbon dioxide emissions accordingly (ghs, ndrc, 2010). Therefore, while adhering to the basic position of not committing to emission reduction obligations, China in Copenhagen has shown a more positive attitude in international climate negotiations and related fields and actively sought wider international climate cooperation. China is willing to take an active part in global climate governance, but this does not mean limiting China's economy with reasonable expectations and realizing comprehensive domestic climate emission reduction reform immediately (Blame, 2010:44). China's position on Climate Governance is closely related to its domestic interests. Whether the intensity and content of greenhouse gas emission reduction technology and domestic economic growth can be coordinated will directly affect China's attitude on greenhouse gas emission reduction. In addition, as a member of the four basic countries, especially the most important developing countries in the international climate negotiations, China's position changes in the negotiations need to consider not only the country itself, but also the role of the four basic countries climate negotiation alliance (Hochstetler, 2014: 224).

The pursuit of national interests is considered to be the most important factor in national bargaining in international climate negotiations (Genovese, 2014:610). In the Copenhagen negotiations, China became the economic entity next only to the United States and the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, making the conflict of interests between China and the United States in the action of climate reduction the key to influencing the negotiating positions of the

two sides. In global climate governance, the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions are exclusively shared by all countries, but the harm is shared by all future generations on the planet. The fourth report of the IPCC shows that the reality of global climate change requires countries to pay attention to the crisis brought about by climate change. But the attitudes of the great powers are different. The United States participates in global governance selectively. It is an inherent guiding principle that the interests of the United States determine the participation of global governance. The reason for China's participation in the mechanism of climate emission reduction lies in the interests of China's domestic economic development (Conrad, 2012:435). The behavior choice of China and the United States in the Copenhagen negotiations, due to the dual influence of identity and interest mechanism, resulted in the conflicting position of major powers, and ultimately the Copenhagen Conference ended in frustration.

Conflict of Identity Orientation between China and the United States: Self-and Other-Orientation of Responsible Person's Identity

In international climate negotiations, concerns about public goods are considered to be about how to position leaders and how to provide more effective public goods. Therefore, in the climate negotiations, the following of leaders always exists (Parker, 2015:434). So, the Copenhagen Climate Conference is considered to be a struggle for leadership in climate governance (Parker, 2015:268). However, in the Copenhagen negotiations, as the opposite side of the conflict, China and the United States are not concerned about the struggle for leadership, but how to make others take more responsibility and how to determine the self-identity of the international climate reduction action. China's identity orientation has been influenced by the pressure of the international community, so there has been self-adjustment of identity. Before the Copenhagen Conference and during the negotiations in Copenhagen, China clearly recognized and actively fulfilled its responsibility for climate reduction actions. But as an active participant in the international community, China has taken voluntary action to reduce emissions in order to promote global governance and promote global interests, rather than as the main responsible person for greenhouse gas emissions. With the rapid development of China's economy, China has been under pressure from the international community to become a world power and assume the responsibility of global governance. As early as 2003, some researchers believed that China was and should change its status. They believed that China was adjusting the status of developing countries and that its foreign policy was based on the rising status of a great power with more diverse interests and responsibilities (Medeiros and Frqavel, 2003:23).

The U.S. identity has been transformed by its attitude towards climate governance, hoping to maintain its influence in global affairs while avoiding becoming a provider of Climate Governance public goods. The United States led the beginning of the global environmental governance agenda and enabled the international community to reach the Montreal Protocol for joint action on ozone depletion. However, the attitude of the U.S. government has not been positive since then, because global climate governance needs more active action and more specific goals, which is not in line with the perception of U.S. policymakers during this period (Cox and Stokes, 2012:353). As the only hegemonic country and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States has been wavering its position on how to define its role in Climate Governance for a long time after the start of international climate negotiations. During the Kyoto negotiations, the United States identified the main responsible person, but in 2001 the Bush administration denied it by refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol. The return of the United States to Paris in 2007 is considered to be the framework for returning to global climate negotiations. The United States has shifted its position in Global Climate Governance from marginal to central. Therefore, Copenhagen as an important undertaking of the Paris Conference, the active participation of major powers in the urgent threat of climate change, makes the international community highly expect to reach a new climate agreement. The Copenhagen Climate Summit began on December 7, 2009 and ended on December 18, 2009. The aim of this meeting is to reach a global cooperative action on climate change after 2012 under the framework convention. From the beginning of the negotiations, there were clear differences among countries. Around the issue of how to fulfill common but differentiated responsibilities, there are disputes on the different forms, levels of efforts and verifiability of climate mitigation responsibilities. Among the negotiating parties, the key differences lie in four aspects: greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, climate change

adaptation, and economic support and technology for developing countries (Leggett and Lattanzio, 2014: 143). Among these different opinions, how to determine the climate reduction targets becomes the key to the unsustainable negotiations. Some countries, including the United States, are trying to make all negotiators bear specific emission reduction targets, while most developing countries refuse to accept such unfair proposals. More complex, vulnerable countries, including small island and third world countries, are more afraid of the devastating effects of global warming. Therefore, the changes in the negotiating camp are manifested in the concern and choice of the behavior of the great powers: the choice of the Danish draft adhered to by the developed countries or the choice of the opposition between the two positions adhered to by the emerging countries under the Beijing text. At the end of Copenhagen, a Copenhagen agreement based on the Beijing text was reached. The lack of legal effect in international action to deal with climate change made the conference regarded as a failure. From the perspective of the continuity of international climate negotiations, it is still meaningful. From the standpoint of the negotiating parties, the meeting highlighted the role of China and the United States as major emitters in climate negotiations, and how to deal with the relationship between major powers in international climate negotiations has become an important and key issue in subsequent negotiations. The climate talks in Copenhagen have led to a direct confrontation between China and the United States in dealing with climate change. There is a conflict of interest between the two sides on how to determine actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the two sides have demonstrated the important influence of Sino-US behavioral choices on the process of global climate governance.

Sino-US Cooperation in Paris Climate Negotiations

The Paris Conference is another test of cooperation among major powers in international climate negotiations. The Paris Conference has once again shouldered the burden of saving human destiny, becoming another international climate negotiation that has been given popularity after the Copenhagen Conference. At the Paris Conference, the expectation of the international community was to enable major economic entities and major greenhouse gas emitters to assume responsibility and international cooperation in climate governance, to undertake the global climate governance agenda after the Kyoto mechanism in 2020, and to achieve the medium- and long-term goals of 2050 on how to control global climate change. The Paris Conference not only bears the expectations of the parties to maximize national interests and predict future benefits in the future climate change, but also bears the second legally binding plan on how to promote the parties to achieve Climate Governance and establish a truly global participatory International Climate Governance mechanism. All countries are joining in the global action against climate change to ensure that the cooperation of all parties can play a positive and effective role in climate change governance. In this negotiation, both China and the United States acknowledged and made the responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and regarded it as an important measure to promote domestic low-carbon transformation, and accordingly adjusted their position in international climate negotiations. Therefore, the Paris Conference became a witness of the transition from conflict to cooperation between China and the United States in international climate negotiations. With this effort, China and the United States have achieved cooperation among major powers at the Paris Conference and promoted joint action by the international community to deal with climate change.

China's Responsibility Pressure for Emission Reduction

From the domestic background, China's economy is at a critical moment of transformation. China has not yet fallen into the carbon-intensive growth path of developed countries. It has tremendous development potential and economic attraction, leaping over the old offset technology. If China adopts existing energy-saving and low-carbon technologies in housing and infrastructure construction in the next decade, it can increase productivity and reduce its energy demand by 20% by 2020 (China news, 2011). Thus, China takes advantage of the technological opportunities created by climate change to form a new green competitive advantage. This not only provides China with a plan to cope with the development path of high carbon emissions, but also provides China with the innovation and development advantages of green energy industry development. China's long-term high-carbon economic development model has made it face the urgent fact that China is not only the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide, but also the country with the largest number of people affected by natural disasters. China's immediate and effective

action on climate emission reduction is not only in line with the common development interests of human society, but also in response to national and national interests. Therefore, China's climate mitigation initiative is a regretless action, and has nothing to do with the United States' emission reduction goals, nor with the Copenhagen Conference to reach an agreement. China's actions and feasibility in reducing climate emissions are in line with China's own development interests and core national interests, as well as with the concept of green development.

The Pressure of America's Responsibility for Emission Reduction

Domestic awareness of climate change in the United States has expanded from economic to security. In 2003, the United States began to realize the impact of climate change on its national security. The report on the abrupt climate change and its significance to the national security of the United States was the forerunner of the United States concern about the impact of climate change on its national interests. From the perspective of national security, the Obama administration has taken more positive actions and attitudes than previous governments, that is, actively promoting the new green economy policy. On the issue of climate change and national security, he said that climate change is an urgent issue and a national security issue that must be taken seriously (Holland, 2008:19). In 2015, Mr. Obama reiterated the importance of climate change and suggested that no country could stand out from the impact of climate change (Malloy and Holmes, 2015: 23).

In the post-Copenhagen era, international climate negotiations became a game platform for the power and interests of all parties in international politics. The factors that can influence the negotiation trend are the choice of the major powers in the negotiation. In the international climate negotiations, the differences between developing and developed countries have always existed and intensified, and the negotiation process is also an important platform for political contest between all parties. In this game, developing countries, especially emerging economies, need more autonomy, rather than compulsory commitments to reduce climate emissions that violate economic development needs and national strength. Therefore, global climate negotiations are a long-term process. Every progress of international climate negotiations needs to clarify the allocation of responsibilities of major actors in climate reduction, create and realize the basis for national cooperation in addressing climate change, make major emitters bear the responsibility of reducing emissions and promote consensus among all parties to achieve truly effective joint action of the international community.

Great Power Cooperation in Paris Negotiations: Choice of Responsible Persons and Benefit Acquisition

In global governance, as the most important national actor in the international arena, all countries are required to fulfil and assume their obligations and responsibilities in international affairs. In international climate governance, besides the common but differentiated responsibilities of all countries, there is also a requirement for all countries to share responsibilities. In the era of globalization, based on the need to solve climate change and the problems arising therefrom, how to share the responsibility of governing global issues and coordinate the conflicts of interests between countries has become the biggest obstacle to determine the choice of behavioral strategies for countries to participate in international climate negotiations and global climate governance. In the Paris negotiations, China and the United States have become the focus of attention of the negotiating parties. As a key actor in the international climate negotiations, whether China and the United States achieve cooperation in the negotiations will affect the final outcome of the negotiations, while the factors affecting their negotiating positions need to examine two important variables: identity and interests. At the Paris Summit, China and the United States clearly indicated that they would assume the main responsibility for climate reduction in global climate governance, especially the responsibility of major powers corresponding to their status. At the same time, China and the United States will take the development of domestic low-carbon economy as the internal driving force, linking climate reduction actions with the growth of national interests. Interest commonality in domestic comprehensive emission reduction actions and the need for Global Climate Governance provide space for cooperation between major powers in this negotiation.

The Obama Administration's Identity Adjustment: Responsibility and Leadership

During the cold war, the United States occupied the main position and assumed the main responsibility in the international mechanism. However, after the cold war, the situation of free-riding opportunities given to other

countries by international mechanisms and American hegemony has changed, which is evident in climate negotiations and environmental governance. The United States began to participate in global governance selectively, and its inherent guiding principle is to determine the participation of global governance in the interests of the United States. The change in US attitude in international climate negotiations is clearer: the US's position preferences in climate negotiations depend on its willingness to try to lead. In previous negotiations, the interests of the United States in participating in climate negotiations lie not only in the cost-benefit analysis of negotiating behavior, but also in the cost of manipulating the preferences of other countries (Saunders, 2006:12). On climate change and the resulting global climate governance issues, the United States has positioned itself as a participant rather than a responsible person. It wants to lead and influence the Climate Governance agenda, but refuses to assume the primary responsibility for climate governance, let alone provide public goods for climate governance. Following the global cooperation on environmental issues initiated by the Montreal Protocol, the position of the United States Government has changed with the presidency. The Reagan administration has always acted reluctantly on the issue of climate change, and has not fulfilled its campaign promise (Rosenbaum, 2005:7). American environmentalists have succeeded in gaining a place in American politics and culture and in influencing American elections (Rosenbaum, 2005:24). Clinton participated in the Kyoto Protocol, but made promises that could not be fulfilled. George W. Bush was called the spokesman for fossil energy (Cox and Stokes, 2012:357). Therefore, the President's inactive or positive performance will affect the government's attitude on environmental issues. In the process of the change of the US government, the change of the President has also made the attitude of the US government to participate in the issue of climate emission reduction adjust. In other words, they have always had doubts about whether to position themselves as the main responsibility and leader of global climate public goods. In January 2009, the Obama administration showed a more positive attitude and took the initiative to take responsibility for climate reduction. The report of the President's Climate Action Plan was released in 2013. This report is the representative of Obama's climate initiative diplomacy. It not only makes the U.S. climate policy move from decentralization to systematization, but also sets a comprehensive three-dimensional climate policy for the U.S. which explicitly requires the U.S. to enhance its leadership in climate change and try to reshape its leadership in global climate governance (Wong, 2015:268). China believes that the developed industrialized countries of the United States should bear the consequences and responsibilities of climate change caused by their historical emissions in global climate governance. For China, the purpose of participating in international climate negotiations has been to safeguard national interests from damage for quite a long time. China's attitude is cautious and refuses to accept the tasks imposed by the international community. China's attitude at the Copenhagen Conference shows that it will affect whether China participates in the mechanism of climate reduction. The reason lies in China's domestic economic development interests. China's attitude on greenhouse gas emission reduction is whether the emission reduction technology and domestic economic growth can be coordinated in content. Otherwise, it would be a paradox that China should be both the center of global economic development and the main responsibility of climate emission reduction (Balme, 2011:44). From Copenhagen to the Paris Conference, China's position has been adjusted and its attitude is more clear: on the one hand, China still needs to consider the impact of ecological vulnerability, marginal costs and benefits of participating in the climate mechanism and the fairness of the international climate mechanism, but China does not lack the political will to reduce emissions. On the premise of China's corresponding emission reduction capacity and national interests, China will actively participate in the process of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and actively participate in the international carbon market in order to win international recognition and create a responsible image of a large country. On the other hand, as the most important developing country participating in the international climate negotiations, China's negotiating position needs to reflect the responsibilities and responsibilities of the major powers. Therefore, China is expounding its position from the perspective of climate strategy and shaping China's international image. In the form of national interests, China is willing to promote China's international climate politics, that is, China is willing to create a positive international image as a responsible stakeholder (Kopra, 2012:121). At the Paris Conference, China and the United States continued to take an active position of assuming responsibility for climate reduction. Both sides agreed to

promote the negotiation process actively and constructively, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, to ensure that the Paris Conference in 2015 reached an agreement on time and to build a fair and reasonable international climate regime. At the same time, China and the United States have complementary needs in the field of climate change. Firstly, the Obama administration hopes to improve its image in Global Climate Governance by bilateral climate diplomacy with developing countries like China, while China hopes to ease pressure from the European Union by taking advantage of the relatively negative position of the United States; secondly, China and the United States support the formulation of climate change rules for the socio-economic interests of major powers. There are common interests: the United States agrees that the reduction of emissions can be achieved politically and technically, while China has always insisted on its participation as a developing country in global emission reduction actions; third, China and the United States welcome in-depth cooperation in low-carbon technology. Cooperation on climate change issues is also a booster for China and the United States to build a new type of big power relationship. The trend of transition from the North-South dispute to the big-and-small dispute in international climate negotiations has made China and the United States shoulder the responsibility of leading climate change cooperation. Unlike the South China Sea and cyber security issues, China and the United States share a common prospect of cooperation on climate change issues. The pressures facing the two countries are very similar to each other to a large extent. Therefore, China and the United States have broad potential for cooperation in the field of climate change. Overall, Sino-US cooperation and joint declaration are important for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. China and the United States have launched emission reduction actions as formally as possible, and the joint action of China and the United States has helped to urge other countries to join in climate reduction actions (Whitehouse, 2016). The Paris Accord provides a new model of climate governance. It replaces the top-down mechanism of Kyoto mechanism with a bottom-up responsibility allocation mechanism for climate reduction, and establishes a mechanism of independent contribution. The success of this mechanism is based on Sino-US cooperation. On the one hand, both China and the United States have adjusted their status of participation in Global Climate Governance and responsibility for climate reduction. Obama brought the U.S. government back to the center from the edge of climate governance, stressed the possible crisis impact of climate change on human beings, and called for global cooperation. In this process, Obama believed that the United States should play a leading role, and that the United States has an important and primary responsibility to deal with climate change. The Chinese government has always played a positive role in climate governance. General Secretary Xi Jinping put forward that China will assume its responsibilities in global development as a big country and work for the common interests and well-being of mankind. Both China and the United States recognize that the absence of China and the United States in Climate Governance will have a negative demonstration effect on global action to tackle climate change together. They also realize that China and the United States, as world powers, have an inescapable responsibility in global governance. Therefore, China and the United States have issued the first joint statement of China and the United States on climate change for three consecutive years since 2013, and are committed to working together to address climate change. On the other hand, China and the United States have changed their interest judgment on the responsibility of climate mitigation. However, in the post-Copenhagen period, the energy innovation and economic transformation achieved by China and the United States under the influence of the economic crisis provided a realistic basis for climate emission reduction. Since the Fifth Five-Year Plan, China has been actively pursuing sustainable development and strengthening environmental governance and protection. In the 13th Five-Year Plan, Xi Jinping put forward the concept of green development to guide China's economic and social development in a virtuous circle and establish an ecological economic system to improve China's development level. Under the guidance of this idea, China gradually realizes the process of economic industry transformation and upgrading, and vigorously develops the green energy industry. It is the inherent requirement and driving force for the development of China's green economic system that China assumes the responsibility of reducing climate emissions and submits its plans and objectives to the international community independently. From the perspective of the Obama administration's plan, participating in Global Climate Governance and assuming responsibility for climate reduction will not only benefit the construction of domestic clean energy

system, but also become an important part of the global leadership return plan. As a result, the United States Government participated actively in the Paris Conference and contributed to a number of bilateral climate agreements. Under the influence of dual adjustment of identity and interest determination, unprecedented cooperation space and opportunities have emerged between China and the United States. Under the impact of climate change on human beings, China and the United States, as the two largest greenhouse gas emitters, have submitted their own national contribution documents to climate reduction, put forward their plans and objectives for climate reduction in the next five years, and established a five-year inventory mechanism to achieve the effectiveness of Climate Governance actions. The cooperation between China and the United States made the Paris Conference a success, and established the basic framework for global climate cooperation for the international community after 2020.

After Hegemony: The Rise of the 3.0 Age of Global Climate Governance-Take America's Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement as an Example

On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced that the United States would stop participating in the Paris Accord on Climate Change Mitigation in 2015. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Trump announced that he would help the U.S. energy sector, especially the fossil fuel industry and workers, so withdrawing from the Paris Accord could be said to be a definite accident in line with Trump's U.S. priority principle (McGrath, 2016). In this regard, only a few members of the Republican Party of the United States celebrated, while the voice of opposition on the international political arena was overwhelming, and criticism from the American people rose one after another (Shear, 2017). The Paris Agreement finalized in December 2015 by 195 parties participating in the negotiation process of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change can be said to be a milestone in the international community's joint response to global climate change in recent years, especially because of the accession of the United States during the Obama administration and its support for Sino-US climate dialogue and cooperation. It is a positive outcome of the Convention process (bbc.co, 2016). However, the introduction of the Paris Accord by the Trump Government will certainly make the process of Global Climate Governance full of variables. At the same time, the actions of the Trump Administration of the United States may herald the advent of the 3.0 era of global governance, and also bring new challenges to the participation of the international community, especially the emerging powers, in global climate politics. This section first reviews the process of U.S. participation in global climate governance, with a view to understanding the continuity and variability of U.S. political participation in climate, thus further analyzing the motivation of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Accord, and finally analyzing and prospecting the new trends in the era of Global Climate Governance 3.0.

Review of U.S. Participation in Global Climate Politics

In 1993, President Clinton came to power, working with Vice President Gore to address the international obligations of global climate change, clearly recognizing the impact of climate change, and willing to take practical action on equity and responsibility in this regard. The Clinton Administration therefore proposed a reduction target aimed at maintaining greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by 2012, although it was not mandatory; the United States participated actively in the 1997 international climate negotiations and signed the Kyoto Protocol the following year, and according to the provisions of the Protocol, the United States will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7% by 2010, taking into account that Congress is still controlled by Republicans and has not submitted the protocol to Congress for approval (Lemberg, 2004:13). In other words, President Clinton may strengthen environmental regulation as much as possible through executive power, but in decision-making, he takes into account the demands of various interest groups in the United States, so climate policy and legislation during the Clinton Administration were limited.

Climate politics has taken a turn for the better during the Obama administration. During his first term of office, President Obama regarded climate change as a major issue closely related to energy and national security, and gradually upgraded climate change to a security issue (Rasmussen and Birk, 2012:46). In 2009, President Obama issued a presidential decree on federal leadership in environmental, energy and economic performance to improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions through action (Obama, 2009). It should be pointed out that the

Obama administration also faces many challenges in climate change legislation. For example, the complex game among interest groups in turn has a negative impact on climate change legislation and policy formulation, thus delaying Climate Governance actions (Watson, 2012:177). Despite the difficult steps in addressing climate change, President Obama has focused on public-private partnerships to minimize carbon emissions and actively develop a clean energy economy (Potyraj, 2017). The Paris Accord on Global Climate Politics in 2015 is, to some extent, one of the most important diplomatic and political achievements of President Obama's presidency. On March 28, 2017, Trump signed a presidential decree aimed at removing former President Barack Obama's environmental record, rewriting the clean power plan and repealing other relevant environmental regulations (Washington Post, 2017). In 2017, Trump officially announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Accord, saying it was in defence of the interests of the United States and its citizens, and that the Paris Accord would greatly damage the interests of the United States coal industry (Whitehouse, 2017). At the same time, Trump criticized the Green Climate Fund as a conspiracy to rob the rich and help the impoverished (nytimes, 2017). As the world's largest economy and the only superpower since the Post-Cold War era, as well as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the participation of the United States in climate politics is of great importance to the development of global climate politics, but it often becomes a hegemonic power of the United States, a dependency of traditional security and domestic politics.

An Analysis of the Motivation of the US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement

1) Trump's personal factors. Trump himself is a typical climate change sceptic. As early as 2012, Mr. Trump accused Twitter of global warming as a global hoax created by China to weaken the competitiveness of the United States (Politico, 2016).

2) Interest group factor. The influence of interest groups on American politics has existed since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and environmental politics cannot be excluded. The strength of non-environmental industrial interest groups is bound to weaken environmental initiatives and force them to take defensive measures, such as advocating non-mandatory pollution prevention and control and public-private cooperation. Obviously, such concessions may mitigate the attacks of those private interest groups on environmental advocates, but they may also make the United States participate in climate politics. Effectiveness is greatly reduced (Morgenstern and Pizer, 2007:122).

New Trends in the Age of Global Climate Governance 3.0

Following the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Accord of 2015 can be regarded as the third milestone in the history of global climate politics. Moreover, the Paris Accord covers a wide range of areas and has made a clear path plan for Global Climate Governance after 2020. At the same time, the birth of the Paris Accord is naturally the product of the complex game of global climate politics, which reflects the dynamic change of global climate political pattern to a certain extent. In fact, the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Accord in 2017 strengthens the fragmentation characteristics of global climate politics and preliminarily reflects the arrival of the 3.0 era of global climate governance. This new trend is mainly manifested in the following aspects:

1) After hegemony or the transformation of global climate political leaders. Since the Post-Cold War era, the controversy about the decline of American hegemony has never ceased, and until the outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis in 2008, the anxiety of the post-hegemony era once reached its peak (Walt, 2011:6). The American scholars represented by Keohane even prescribed a prescription to maintain the post-hegemonic world political and economic order through international system and cooperation. Keohane's academic interest in recent years turned to the issue of climate change, which is just a test ground for testing post-hegemonic cooperation and looking forward to the future of political science (Keohane, 2015:19). Reflected in the response to global issues, including climate change, cross-border refugees, terrorism and other non-traditional security intertwined, the United States always forgets its global leadership status, and seeks to dictate on these issues, or even implement unilateralism. This is often not very constructive in terms of global governance, on the contrary, it may sharpen the contradictions

in the original problem areas. On the one hand, the international community may have to struggle to seek international cooperation in these areas in order to promote global governance as much as possible; on the other hand, it may have to take care of the interests of the United States in order to integrate the world's most powerful countries into the international mechanism. The United States, as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, if it is totally separated from the world. The effectiveness of global climate governance will be greatly undermined by the constraints of the climate regime. Therefore, whether or not the hegemony of the United States becomes a reality, the global climate political system arrangements for the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement need to be treated with caution. In the field of global climate governance, the United States has never been a qualified global leader, so the so-called lack of global leadership after the withdrawal of the United States is a false proposition in a sense. Given the fact that the United States often acts as a troublemaker on climate politics issues, withdrawing from the Paris Accord can be said to be a retro of American climate politics, because it is similar to the Kyoto Protocol withdrawn under George W. Bush. The so-called transformation of the status of global political leaders is a warning from the case of the United States withdrawing from the Paris Accord that the governance of climate change, a global public problem, should never rely on a single hegemonic country; the conclusion and entry into force of the Paris Accord at least reflects the international community's risk of climate change. The consciousness of the former human destiny community has been strengthened, and the next focus is on how to implement the responsibility of the state, overcome the relative benefits of the state and strive for absolute benefits. Since the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, the process of global climate governance has gradually transited to the 3.0 era. Its main symbol is that the emerging powers have moved from the edge to the center. With the birth and entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the leadership status in the field of global climate governance is also facing differentiation and restructuring, and a series of new international systems and rules are being rectified. In terms of formation, climate finance and technology, innovative mechanisms and new impetus are called for. As a result, the emerging countries represented by China, Brazil and South Africa have opened the third path of global climate governance, which is manifested by the prominent coordinating role of emerging powers and the overlapping of multiple groups.

The Future of Global Climate Governance

The growing number and scale of parties to international climate negotiations have confirmed the real threat of climate change. The global concern generated by the Copenhagen and Paris conferences has also made joint response to climate change the most urgent global action of this century. From the first Conference of the Parties and the first Kyoto Protocol with a legal agreement to the signing of the Paris Agreement, the importance of large countries participation in climate governance is crucial to collective action on climate governance. Identity has become the main way for national actors to engage in actions to meet the challenges of nature, because identity is a model of how self-realization is related to the ability of sustained understanding between others and to respond to social change (Cianchi, 2016:33). The political consensus and action plan of Sino-US climate cooperation not only build the confidence of the Paris Climate Conference in reaching a global climate agreement, but also set the overall objectives, principles and implementation roadmap for the Paris Agreement, eliminating the core obstacles. More importantly, Sino-US climate cooperation will be the ballast stone for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and for the cohesion of global consensus and cooperation. In addressing climate change, we should promote the development of multilateral coordination framework mechanism through cooperation among major powers. In the process of UN Climate Governance for more than 20 years, progress has been made in system design and emission reduction efficiency. In the future, UN Climate Governance will continue to move forward with the development of global economic low-carbon and co-governance by major powers. In the process of successful international climate negotiations, as the first two greenhouse gases in the world, whether China and the United States can effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions and assume responsibility for Climate Governance will play a key role. Copenhagen and Paris have proved this point, but it cannot replace the value of collective action. In future global climate governance, the task of collective consensus and collective action is needed to address climate change.

Issues in Future Global Climate Cooperation

Whether leaders are needed in global climate governance remains a hidden danger in international climate negotiations. Leadership in international climate negotiations is becoming more and more important, because it is related to the election of leadership and the strategy of followers, but leaders must provide public interests. Therefore, in climate negotiations, the search for and follow-up to leaders always exists (Parker, 2015:434). But the need for leaders in Climate Governance to provide public goods is one of the obstacles to progress in international climate negotiations. In the response to global climate change, only when the benefits are higher than the costs can national actors consider providing public goods. Because in global warming, behavior is more likely to bring about short-term costs, and the possible benefits may only be in the future (Schiele, 2014:16). Therefore, the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the Commons always exist in the course of international climate negotiations. Among the solutions to the negotiation deadlock, two are quite effective: the importance of mediation and the change of leadership status (Bercovitch and Lutmar, 2010:232). The impasse at the international level is due to the influence of some distribution of domestic interests (Druckman and Narlikar, 2010:269). The reason why the United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol was to endanger national interests. But whether or not leaders in Climate Governance exist and should exist has become a major problem in climate negotiations.

In the Kyoto negotiations, the European Union assumed a leading role in a sense, but the Kyoto mechanism, which did not involve the United States, was overshadowed and could not cope with the difficulties and challenges brought about by global climate change after the absence of the United States. At one time, Sino-US Communist Rule of Law became the voice of the international community. Its result was the confrontation and conflict between China and the United States in Copenhagen Conference. The basis of Sino-US Communist Rule of Law was that China and the United States had sufficient capacity and willingness to act, but both sides refused to accept the position given by the International community. Finally, it is affirmed that China and the United States have agreed to assume and accept the main responsibility of reducing climate emissions in global climate governance, and to promote global action to tackle climate change in a cooperative manner with major powers. During the Paris Conference, the Chinese delegation participated in the negotiations in a responsible and constructive manner and maintained consultations with major countries. On the basis of the Sino-US Joint Statement on Climate Change, the Chinese delegation sought possible solutions acceptable to all parties on the key issues of long-term emission reduction goals and transparency. It played an indispensable role among the countries in the north and the south. Coordination has promoted mutual trust and consensus among different groups.

China has no intention of acting as a leader in climate negotiations, but rather as a partner matching the diplomatic strategy of responsible great powers. After rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the United States has never denied its pursuit of influence in the international climate regime. But the United States is seeking a voice on Climate Governance issues. On the basis of recognizing that the United States has the responsibility of climate change governance, it seeks and maintains the leadership role and role it has always adhered to in terms of funding and mitigation actions for climate governance (Tamm, 2012:120). Therefore, in the future global climate governance, China and the United States on the list of greenhouse gas emissions will still have the possibility of a tug-of-war on the responsibility and specific actions of climate reduction. Because the national independent contribution document is only the statement of each country on the responsibility of climate reduction, the actual action still needs to be tested.

Spillover effects of Global Climate Governance

Great powers participating in energy innovation brought about by climate reduction will bring about a new round of energy technology revolution and competition. At present, under the framework convention, Climate Governance provides the development space for all countries in the world, including technology transfer, adaptation action and carbon trading under market mechanism and climate trading mechanism (Kameyama and Sari, 2008 : 195). After 2000, China began to innovate clean energy. It not only participated more actively in clean energy projects, but also led many projects and plans. China has also put forward a national development plan: a national-scale energy efficiency plan to reduce energy density, to achieve 20% emission reduction from 2006 to 2016, and finally an additional target of 16% emission reduction from 2011 to 2015, which will ultimately achieve 17% carbon reduction (Gupta,

2012:168). By the end of 2011, China has the world's largest wind power equipment and capacity, and will invest more in nuclear energy. This will help China to achieve greater success in the market mechanism competition of clean energy. China has now turned to involving Western countries and fulfilling existing commitments (Gupta,2012:168). Bush's solution to climate change in 2007 was to develop clean energy technologies in the United States, including nuclear, solar and wind power (Machin, 2013:13). Mr. Obama believes that the United States should change its fossil energy consumption to new energy applications in response to the challenges posed by climate change, and that the United States has maintained its leading position in the world. At the same time, he stressed that the United States should maintain leadership in addressing climate change, otherwise it would be too late (Whitehouse, 2015). Mr. Obama said that developing energy, especially clean energy, is not only an industrial development plan to deal with the economic crisis, but also a goal to break the dependence on foreign oil and energy (Whitehouse, 2014). The Obama administration wants to combine environmental policies for clean energy development with economic recovery plans, so that the United States can regain its leadership in international climate politics. Behind the Paris Accord, there is a fierce game between great powers. The climate negotiations are ostensibly to deal with climate warming, but in essence, they are still the competition of economic interests and development space of countries.

Conclusion

The international community under the Framework Convention has held 23 meetings to address climate change. The Copenhagen and Paris conferences are not only the two summits in which major powers play a prominent role in the process of global climate governance, but also the symbol of the era of cooperation between major powers in global climate governance. In these two negotiations, as the largest carbon emitter and economic entity, whether China and the United States choose to cooperate or not has a key impact on the Global Climate Governance agenda: non-cooperation in the former and cooperation in the latter. Therefore, this paper focuses on the following questions: why did China and the United States have two distinct choices in these two meetings, which led to the realization of the two meetings from conflict to cooperation? This paper examines the differences in behavioral choices between China and the United States at this meeting by applying the analytical eclecticism method, from the definition of identity and interest determination in climate negotiations, and considering whether recognition as the responsible person and taking action to reduce emissions are beneficial to national interests.

Through the comparative analysis of two cases, this paper argues that: in Copenhagen Conference, China and the United States refused to assume the identity of the responsible person, and regarded the action of climate reduction as a loss of national interests, resulting in the failure of cooperation; in Paris Conference, China and the United States accepted the definition of the identity of the responsible person, and from the domestic new energy innovation and green development. From the perspective of climate mitigation as a beneficial choice for national interests, thus facilitating cooperation between the two sides. This paper uses the analytical eclecticism approach to examine the differences and changes in the behavior of large countries in the field of climate governance, but whether this approach can be applied to large-country cooperation in other fields still needs to be verified. At the same time, the continuation of cooperation among major powers in future climate governance is also affected by the change of the U.S. government, domestic political ecology and other factors of national response. Therefore, we should pay attention to the role of other factors in future research.

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